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COMMENT





Cleanup of hazardous waste sites has become one of the leading problems
of the decade.1 Since the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)2 in 1980, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)3 in 1976, courts have
found private parties liable for past hazardous waste activities of site owners,
operators, waste generators, and transporters.4 Under CERCLA, the Fed-
eral Government can order responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste
sites5 or can clean up the contamination itself' and later sue the responsible
1. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, H.R. REP. No. 253(I),
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835-37.
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9657 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), reauthorized and amended in part by Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1987)).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6991 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regu-
lates the waste management practices of generators and transporters of hazardous waste as
well as owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 42
U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924. It also provides a remedy for combating environmental contamination.
Under RCRA, the Federal government may institute an action to restrain any person contrib-
uting to the creation or maintenance of an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
and the environment. Id. § 6928. This Comment focuses specifically on the question of insur-
ance coverage for environmental liabilities under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and does not address RCRA liabilities and in-
surance related issues.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
744 (8th Cir. 1986) (corporate officer held liable because he personally arranged for the trans-
portation and disposal of hazardous wastes), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); New York v.
North Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (officer and stockholder held
liable for cleanup costs as an "owner or operator").
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
6. Id. § 9604.
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parties for recovery of the cleanup costs.7 The liabilities imposed pursuant
to CERCLA have created an enormous financial burden for the responsible
parties.8 To defray the costs incurred in the cleanup, these parties have
sought reimbursement from their liability insurance carriers.
Disputes have arisen over insurance coverage for the costs of hazardous
waste cleanup. The general provision of the standard comprehensive general
liability (CGL) insurance policy provides that the insurer "pay on behalf of
the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of... property damage.. . ."' Disclaiming coverage for
cleanup costs, insurance companies have typically argued that government
actions pursuant to CERCLA seek equitable remedies which insurers are
not obligated to pay as damages.1 ° Even assuming that damages include
cleanup costs, insurers have argued that cleanup costs are not the measure of
property damage and therefore are not covered under the CGL policy. 1
For there to be coverage, according to the insurers, the government actions
must seek damages and they must allege property damage. 2 Those insured,
by contrast, take the position that CGL policies provide coverage for "all
sums" the insured may be held liable to pay as a result of property damage,
including cleanup costs. 13
Court decisions are by no means uniform in the resolution of this dis-
pute.14 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Cir-
cuits have determined that the term "damages" limits the coverage available
to the insured' 5 and that cleanup costs constitute equitable relief that is not
within the damages limitation.' 6 Thus, those courts hold that where the
underlying government actions do not claim damages, but seek to impose
7. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
8. See generally Chesler, Rodburg, & Smith, Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insur-
ance Coveragefor Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9, 11-13 (1986) (discussing
the magnitude of costs incurred in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites).
9. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.
(NEPACCO), 842 F.2d 977, 983 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 588, 336
N.W.2d 838, 842 (1983).
14. See infra notes 69, 101 and accompanying text.
15. See NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 985-86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 703 (1988).
16. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988);
NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1354. Accord Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955).
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equitable remedies, there is no coverage under the policy.' 7 Other federal
and state courts have concluded, to the contrary, that cleanup costs are dam-
ages within the meaning of the CGL policies." Typically, these courts have
held that cleanup costs are "sums" which the insured is legally obligated to
pay because of property damage.'9 The different views espoused by the
courts hinge on the interpretation of the relevant clauses in the CGL poli-
cies.2° Perhaps because courts have treated the issue of coverage for govern-
ment mandated cleanup costs as one governed by state law, the United
States Supreme Court has yet to grant a petition for writ of certiorari. 2'
This Comment analyzes the division of authority regarding coverage for
environmental liabilities. First, this Comment examines the question of
whether response costs under CERCLA, including cleanup costs, constitute
equitable relief or legal damages. It then addresses the issue of whether gov-
ernmentally imposed cleanup costs are covered damages because of property
damage. The Comment concludes that the interpretation of the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, finding no cov-
erage for cleanup costs, accurately states the obligations of the insurer and
the insured under the standard comprehensive general liability insurance
policy.
I. ORIGIN OF LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP
A. CERCLA
The statutory scheme of CERCLA grants broad authority to the Federal
Government to combat contamination of the environment and to protect the
17. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1354.
18. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. This Comment was in print when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in Avondale Indus.,
Inc. v. Travelers Indemn. Co., No. 89-7035, slip op. at 7 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 1989). Therefore,
this Comment does not consider the Second Circuit's decision. However, the Avondale deci-
sion does not alter the conclusion reached by the author.
19. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp.
1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich.), vacated on other grounds, 683 F. Supp. at 1177 (W.D. Mich. 1988);
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, No. 84-2609, slip op. at 12 (E.D.
Pa. June 3, 1986), aff'd, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988).
20. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1189
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that the law of the state that the court applied is dispositive and that
the application of each state's law may provide a different answer to the question of coverage
for cleanup costs).
21. See, e.g., NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977; Armco, 822 F.2d 1348. See also Lac D'Amiante
du Quebec v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1551 n.3 (D.N.J. 1985)
(questioning whether Supreme Court review, is likely given its policy against rulings based on
state law).
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health and welfare of the public.22 CERCLA imposes liability on responsi-
ble parties; namely, owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities,
waste generators, disposers, and transporters. 23 Under CERCLA, the Fed-
eral Government may seek an injunction to compel responsible parties to
clean up hazardous waste sites that constitute an "imminent and substantial
endangerment" to health and the environment.24 Furthermore, the statute
authorizes the government to institute cleanup efforts on its own2 5 and to
subsequently seek reimbursement for expenditures incurred from responsible
parties.26 CERCLA, moreover, permits recovery of cleanup costs expended
22. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Dam-
ages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986, 986-87 (1986) (discussing economic and legal considerations for
imposing liability on parent corporations of subsidiaries that contribute to contamination of
the environment); Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1458, 1465-66, 1517-43 (1986) (discussing the broad standards of liability under CERCLA)
[hereinafter Toxic Waste Developments].
CERCLA has two goals: to clean up the environment if a hazardous substance is released,
or threatens to be released, into the environment; and to hold responsible parties liable for the
costs incurred in cleaning up the environment. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY
SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 253 (III),
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038; see also
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) (Congress promulgated statute in order to
"assur[e] that those who benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the health
and environmental costs of that activity into the costs of doing business."); Habicht, Responses
to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 Hous. L. REV. 111, 114 (1987) (goals of CERCLA require indus-
try to have "substantial impact on the cleanup process" and assist in the "internalization of the
costs of hazardous waste disposal").
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
24. Id. § 9606(a). Section 9606(a) provides, in pertinent part:
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual
or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the
Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to
abate such danger or threat ....
Id.
25. Id. § 9604(a)(1). This section provides that when a hazardous substance or pollutant
has been released, or where there is a substantial threat of such a release into the environment,
the government is authorized to remove or arrange for the removal of the substance or con-
tamination. Id. Money for the cleanup comes from the fund established under CERCLA. See
id. § 9611. Pursuant to section 9607, the government can initiate an action seeking reimburse-
ment of the response costs for the purpose of replenishing this fund. See infra note 26 and
accompanying text.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Section 9607(a) identifies those persons who are liable for
response costs the Federal Government incurred pursuant to sections 9604(a)(1) and 9606.
Section 9607(a)(4) creates three causes of action:
[Any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is a
[Vol. 39:195
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by private individuals.2 7 The government can also institute an action for
damages for injury to natural resources.28
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such
a release.
Id.
27. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). See supra note 26.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). See supra note 26. CERCLA distinguishes between an
action seeking response costs pursuant to subsection 9607(a)(4)(A) and an action requesting a
recovery of damages pursuant to subsection 9607(a)(4)(C). See supra note 26. The Depart-
ment of Interior acknowledged this distinction in comments concerning the regulation on the
assessment of damages under subsection 9607(a)(4)(C):
Natural resource damage assessments are not identical to response or remedial
actions (cleanup) addressed by the larger statutory scheme of CERCLA.... Assess-
ments are not intended to replace response actions, which have as their primary pur-
pose the protection of human health, but to supplement them, by providing a process
for determining proper compensation to the public for injury to natural resources.
51 Fed. Reg. 27674 (1986) (comments accompanying Natural Resource Damage Assessments
Final Rule). To calculate damages under subsection 9607(a)(4)(C), the Department of the
Interior developed a theory of natural resource damages based on the common law principle of
damages, namely "that money can be used to provide substitutionary relief." Id. at 27680. "A
fundamental principle of the theory ... is that natural resource damages are compensatory,
not punitive." Id. Money awarded under this principle represents a measure of "the value of
the thing that is lost." Id. The regulations that were subsequently codified defined damages as
the amount of money sought by the Federal or State government "as compensation for injury,
destruction, or loss of natural resources" as set forth in section 9707(a) of CERCLA. Natural
Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(l) (1988).
The legislative history of CERCLA further supports the view that response or cleanup costs
recovered pursuant to subsection 9607(a)(4)(A) are not the equivalent of damages recoverable
pursuant to subsection 9607(a)(4)(C). In Idaho v. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho
1986), the court, considering a damages claim for injury to natural resources, noted that the
statute did not provide specific guidelines for the calculation of such damages. Id. at 675. The
court consequently relied upon legislative history:
[Senator Simpson, during a Senate debate,] suggested that traditional tort rules for
calculating damages should be observed as appropriate. He commented by way of
example that the law awards the difference in value before and after the injury in
some cases and where the injury can be restored to its original condition for less than
the difference in value, the cost of restoration is the appropriate measure. Damages
to the natural resources may be calculated on a value basis and on a cost-of-restora-
tion basis. The calculation which provides the least recovery in terms of dollars is
the appropriate measure of damages.
Id. at 676 (citation omitted) (citing 126 CONG. REC. 30,986 (1980) (statement of Sen. Simp-
son)). See also Toxic Waste Developments, supra note 22, at 1567-72 (discussing the measure
of damages to natural resources). The court, relying on the statement of Senator Simpson,
recognized that it may calculate natural resource damages on a value basis or on a cost-recov-
1989]
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The potential impact of CERCLA liability on parties responsible for cre-
ating an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment is enor-
mous. CERCLA imposes strict liability on all parties responsible for
improperly handling or disposing hazardous substances.29 CERCLA does
not limit how far back the Federal Government can look to find acts that
have caused or contributed to hazardous waste contamination."0 In addi-
tion, CERCLA holds site owners, operators, waste generators, disposers,
and transporters jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs where the in-
jury is indivisible.3 1 The statute effectively holds all responsible parties liable
for the costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site, even as to contamination
that occurred prior to the enactment of the statute.32
B. The Standard Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy
When the government institutes an action pursuant to CERCLA, request-
ing the insured to clean up the contamination or seeking recovery of costs
the government has incurred as a result of cleaning up the contamination
itself, the insured must respond to the allegations of the government's com-
plaint by either admitting liability, and therefore responding to the demand
for cleanup, or by raising defenses to those allegations. Because of the high
costs involved in responding to environmental contamination at hazardous
ery basis. 635 F. Supp. at 676. But see Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432,
438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding the Department of Interior's rule, which is based on a compari-
son of the loss of use of the damaged resource and the cost of restoration of the damaged
resource, contrary to legislative intent and therefore invalid).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See generally Kaplan, Balloun, & Stigall, Defense Strategies and
Insurance Coverage Issues in a "Superfund" Case, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 554, 556 (1981) (discuss-
ing standard of liability applied to responsible parties).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
742-44 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1985).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
The legislative history of CERCLA explicitly states that the courts are responsible for deter-
mining the standard of liability under CERCLA. The term "joint and several liability" was
deleted from the statute in order to allow courts to establish the scope of liability on a case-by-
case basis in accordance with common law principles. See 126 CONG. REC. 31,966 (1980)
(statement by Rep. Florio); 126 CONG. REC. 30,935 (1980) (statement by Sen. Stafford). In
Chem-Dyne, the court, after reviewing the legislative history of CERCLA, determined that
joint and several liability was appropriate in CERCLA cases when two or more persons cause
a single and indivisible harm. 572 F. Supp. at 810. Other courts have similarly adopted the
joint and several liability standard. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d at 743-44; Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052-53.
32. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 737 (finding that
Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively); United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 220 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (because CERCLA attaches a new legal signifi-
cance to past hazardous waste activities, it is considered retroactive law).
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waste sites, the responsible parties have approached their liability insurance
carriers for legal defense and indemnification.33 The insureds contend that
the CGL policy they purchased provides the broadest coverage available,
which includes representation against government actions under CER-
CLA.34 The insurers, conversely, claim that the parties did not contemplate
coverage for cleanup costs when the policies were issued and therefore such
costs were not covered.35 The disputes that have arisen between the insured
and the insurer generally stem from a disagreement about the interpretation
of certain terms under the CGL policy.
Under the standard CGL policy, the insurer is obligated to "pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of... property damage. ... 3' The policy defines
property damage as "physical injury to or destruction of tangible property
which occurs during the policy period, including the loss of use thereof
. 3' The policy, however, does not define the term damages, and dis-
agreements as to the interpretation of the terms have led to litigation.38
Courts interpreting the terms of standard CGL policies have reached in-
consistent results. 39 General principles of insurance law require that the
33. The standard CGL policy obligates the insurer to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages and to pay all sums as damages because of property damage. Annotation,
Insurer's Duty to Defend Injunctive Proceedings, 53 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1957); see infra note 36
and accompanying text. This Comment does not address the issue of the insurer's obligation
to defend government actions. It focuses solely on the insurer's obligation to indemnify the
insured for sums incurred in connection with government actions.
34. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058, slip op. at 7 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Santa Clara County Jan. 3, 1989) (insured asserts a broad definition of the term damages to
support a finding of coverage). See also Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., No. C-3939-84, op. at 19-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 11, 1987) (bench ruling)
(CGL policies contained broad language), rev'd on other grounds, 231 N.J. Super. 1, 554 A.2d
1342 (App. Div. 1989); Note, The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous
Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 757 (1984) ("The very title 'Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance' suggests the expectation of maximum coverage.").
35. See Toxic Waste Developments, supra note 22, at 1575-76 (discussing insurance crisis
that resulted from the shift of liability from parties responsible for hazardous waste contamina-
tion to the liability insurance companies).
36. Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir.) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988). See also Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Environmen-
tal Litigation, 11 FORUM 762, 764 (1976) (discussing the 1966 standard CGL policy).
37. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 979. See also 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAC-
TICE § 4508.02 n. 1 (1979). The standard CGL policy excludes liability for property damage to
"property owned or occupied by or rented to the insured." Id. § 4493.03 n. 1.
38. Toxic Waste Developments, supra note 22, at 1578-79 (discussing litigation concern-
ing interpretation of the CGL insurance policy).
39. Compare NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985 (finding that the plain meaning of damages did
not constitute equitable monetary relief but rather legal damages) and Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987) (adopting a narrow, technical definition of
19891
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terms of the policy dictate the obligations of the insurer and insured.' If the
language of the policy has a single, plain meaning, then that language will
determine the obligations of the parties.4 ' Clear and unambiguous terms in
the contract are construed according to their plain meaning, that is, what an
ordinary, reasonable lay person would understand the meaning to be.42
Where, however, the terms of the policy are unclear or ambiguous, the gen-
eral rule requires courts to construe the policy language against the in-
surer.43 Differing interpretations of the meaning of the policy terms have
thus resulted in a split in authority on the issue of coverage for cleanup costs.
damages), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988) and Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224
F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (according the term "damages" a legal, technical meaning in
law) with New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D.
Del. 1987) (rejecting the legal, technical definition of the word damages and giving the term an
ordinary, usual meaning) and United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App.
579, 589, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983) (finding the legal, technical interpretation of damages
too narrow).
40. 2 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 15:10 (rev. ed. 1984); see also B. Os-
TRAGER & T. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.01 (1988).
41. See sources cited supra note 40.
42. G. COUCH, supra note 40, §§ 15:17-:18.
43. Id. § 15:74; B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, supra note 40, §§ 1.01-.02. This rule of
construction is frequently referred to as the contra-proferentem doctrine. Some courts apply a
variation of this doctrine based on the reasonable expectations of the insured. Under the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine, in determining the meaning of a policy term, courts consider
what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the word to
mean. B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, supra note 40, § 1.03(b)(2). For an indication of the
courts that apply the reasonable expectations doctrine when interpreting the provision "dam-
ages because of property damage," see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
However, even when the terms of the policy are ambiguous, courts should not automati-
cally construe the language against the insured. The contra-proferentem and reasonable ex-
pectations doctrines, developed by the courts to eliminate the unequal bargaining power of the
insurer as compared to the individual person, should not apply when the insured is a sophisti-
cated company or when the insurance policies are negotiated on behalf of the insured by so-
phisticated brokers, risk managers, or counsel. See B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, supra note
40, § 1.03(c). Thus, when the business insured possesses bargaining power equivalent to that
of the insurer, the rules of construction favoring the insured should not apply. See, e.g., Hal-
pern v. Lexington Ins. Co., 715 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1983) (contra-insurer rule does not
apply when it produces an unreasonable result); Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1180 (3d Cir. 1979) (because parties possessed relatively equal bar-
gaining power, court refused to apply the contra-insurer rule); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
John J. Bordlee Contractors, 543 F. Supp. 597, 602 (E.D. La. 1982) (contra-insurer rule is only
appropriate when the insured is "an innocent and naive party unfamiliar with the insurance
field"); Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953, slip op. at 17
(Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo County July 13, 1988) (tentative decision) (contra-insurer rules do
not apply where insured is "large sophisticated corporation of substantial worth guided in its
insurance negotiations by an able staff" which was assisted by renowned brokers and which
had equal bargaining power).
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II. INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CLEANUP COSTS: INTERPRETATION OF
CGL POLICY TERMS
In determining whether costs incurred in cleaning up contaminated sites
are sums that the insured is legally obligated to pay "as damages.., because
of property damage," 44 courts first consider whether cleanup costs constitute
damages within the meaning of the insurance policy. 4 If the relief sought
by the government pursuant to CERCLA and RCRA constitutes damages,
courts then reach the question of whether the sums the insured seeks to
recover are the measure of property damage.46 Only if courts answer both of
these questions affirmatively is there coverage for cleanup costs under the
standard CGL policy.47
A. Significance of the Nature of the Relief Sought: Equitable Relief or
Legal Damages
Courts disagree on whether governmentally imposed cleanup costs consti-
tute damages, which is a requirement for coverage. 48 Some courts have fore-
closed coverage, holding that the government actions under CERCLA,
which seek reimbursement for cleanup costs or which require that the re-
sponsible parties abate and clean up the contaminated areas, are actions for
equitable relief and not for damages.49 Other courts, adopting a broader
interpretation of damages, have held that cleanup costs are essentially com-
pensatory damages recoverable under a CGL policy.5"
44. Continental Ins. Co. v. NEPACCO, 842 F. 2d 977, 979 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 66 (1988).
45. See, e.g., id.; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
46. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
47. See NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 983.
48. See infra notes 69, 101 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988);
NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1354. Whether the government cleaned up
the contamination itself and later sought reimbursement of the money it expended, or de-
manded that the insured clean up the contamination, courts have held that both remedies are
equitable in nature. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353-54.
50. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp.
1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich.), vacated on other grounds, 683 F. Supp. at 1177 (W.D. Mich. 1988);
Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, Inc. v. Midland Ins. Co., No. L-25610-83, op. at 23
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 17, 1986), rev'don other grounds, 218 N.J. Super. 49, 526 A.2d
1112 (App. Div. 1987); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C.
App. 80, 93, 323 S.E.2d 726, 735 (1984), rev'don other grounds, 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374
(1986).
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1. No Coverage for Cleanup Costs: The Limited Definition of Damages
One of the first cases to distinguish between legal damages and equitable
relief in the insurance context was Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
Hanna. 5  In Hanna, a case decided prior to the enactment of CERCLA, the
insureds sought recovery of costs they expended when complying with a
mandatory injunction.52 The insurer refused to defend the mandatory in-
junction suit, claiming that it had no obligation to provide a defense because
the suit did not require the insured to pay damages.5 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
insurers and held that the insurance policy did not cover expenses incurred
as a result of complying with a mandatory injunction.54 To resolve the ques-
tion of the insurer's duty to defend, the Fifth Circuit looked to the policy
language to determine whether it covered mandatory injunctive orders.55
The court, finding the term "damages" to be plain and unambiguous, deter-
mined that the obligation of the insurer was to pay damages; the insurer was
not obligated to pay the cost of complying with a mandatory injunction.
5 6
The Fifth Circuit explained that the policy covered payments to third per-
sons when those persons had a legal claim for damages against the insured
because of property damage.57 The obligation of the insurer "to pay" was
limited to damages, a term which, according to the court, had "an accepted
technical meaning in law. '"58 Had the adjacent property owners brought an
action for trespass to land against the Hannas, thereby seeking damages, the
insurer would have been obligated to pay as well as to defend the suit.59
However, because the suit against the insured sought only injunctive relief,
the court concluded that there was no duty to defend the mandatory injunc-
tion suit or to indemnify the insureds for sums incurred in connection with
the government action.6°
51. 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
52. Id. at 500-01.
53. Id. at 501.
54. Id. at 503-04.





60. Id. at 504 (citing with approval Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129,
131, 106 A.2d 196, 198 (1954) (costs of complying with an order requiring the removal of an
obstruction are not sums that an insurer is legally obligated to pay as damages, but are sums
designed to prevent reoccurrence of injury)); see also Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 428 F. Supp. 435, 440 (D. Md. 1977) (the relief sought in a Securities and Exchange
Commission action was equitable in nature and was not damages within the meaning of the
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More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
similarly accorded the term "damages" a legal, technical meaning. In Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 61 the insurer sought a declaratory judg-
ment that it was not obligated to defend a CERCLA suit brought against its
insured or to indemnify the insured for sums incurred in connection with
that suit.6 2 The Fourth Circuit began its discussion of the meaning of dam-
ages by acknowledging that, under Maryland law, the court must construe
the terms of an insurance policy according to their ordinary meaning. 63 The
court, however, adopted the approach in Hanna, which subscribed to a legal,
technical definition of the term "damages," precluding coverage for claims
for equitable relief.64 The court noted that the language "to pay as dam-
ages" limited an insurer's obligation to the insured.6" If the court construed
the provision broadly, then the term "damages" would become mere sur-
plusage; the insurer would be required to pay all sums the insured was obli-
gated to pay because of property damage.6 6 After determining that damages
had a specific meaning that limited the insured's obligation under the policy,
the court addressed the question whether the government's claim for relief
was a claim for damages.6 ' Finding that an action for recovery of cleanup
policy); Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 73 Ill. App. 3d 43, 48, 391 N.E.2d 568,
572 (1979) (following Hanna and Desrochers).
61. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
62. Id. at 1350. The government's complaint sought injunctive relief against Armco as
well as reimbursement for costs of removal or remedial action pursuant to subsection
9607(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA. Id. at 1350-51.
63. Id. at 1352 (citing Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 383,
388, 488 A.2d 486, 488 (1985)).
64. Id. (citing Hanna, 224 F.2d 499 and Desrochers, 99 N.H. 129, 106 A.2d 196). The
court observed that Maryland law had similarly adopted a technical definition of damages. Id.
See Haines, 428 F. Supp. at 441 (no coverage for suit for injunctive relief, restitution, and
disgorgement).
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costs constituted an equitable form of relief,6" the Fourth Circuit held that
cleanup costs were not covered under the terms of the insurance policy.69
68. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit focused on the form or type of relief
sought by the government in the CERCLA action. Id. The court noted that even if the
amount of damages awarded to the government under CERCLA subsection 9607(a)(4)(C)
equaled the amount of money recovered by the government for costs incurred in investigating
and cleaning up environmental contamination pursuant to subsection 9607(a)(4)(A), the obli-
gation of the insurer to pay was limited to damages. Id. at 1352-53.
Numerous courts have recognized the equitable nature of the cost recovery remedies pro-
vided under CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Dicker-
son, 640 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 913
(E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 913 (D.N.H. 1985); Wehner v.
Syntex Corp., 618 F. Supp. 37, 37 (E.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353, 1354 (D.N.M. 1983).
69. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352. Other courts have echoed the logic of Armco. See Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., No. JFM-88-99, slip op. at 8-9 (D. Md. June 20, 1989)
(insurer has no obligation to provide coverage to insured for cleanup costs); Grisham v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., No. 88-3063, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 18, 1989) (cleanup costs do not
constitute sums the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Ormond, No. 87-3038, slip op. at 12 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 1989) (same); Ft. McHenry Lumber
Co. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., No. HAR 88-825, slip op. at 6 (D. Md. Sept.
23, 1988) (no coverage for costs incurred as a result of complying with remedial obligations
imposed by consent agreement); Verlan, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950,
955 (N.D. 11. 1988) (under Illinois law, the insurer was not obligated to defend or indemnify
the insured because the underlying complaint did not seek damages); Argonaut Ins. Co. v.
Atlantic Wood Indus., No. 87-0323-R, order at 1 (E.D. Va. June 20, 1988) (environmental
cleanup costs do not constitute damages within the meaning of the CGL policies); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash., 685 F. Supp. 742, 744-45 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (response costs
are equitable in nature and, under Washington law, are not covered by the terms of the insur-
ance policy); Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (no
coverage for expenses for investigation and clean up of contaminated groundwater because
Florida state authority did not seek damages); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Medley, No. 87-1167-3,
slip op. at 8 (D.S.D. Oct. 29, 1987) (government claims for cleanup costs are "prophylactic in
nature" and therefore not covered under the terms of the policies), aff'd sub nom. Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988) (CGL policies do not provide
coverage for claims seeking equitable relief); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. King, 673 F. Supp. 384,
387 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (no coverage for claims seeking equitable relief); Purex Indus., Inc. v.
Proctor, No. C-446-935, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County July 19, 1988) (no
coverage for government suits seeking recovery of cleanup costs); Transport Indem. Ins. Co. v.
Argonaut Ins. Co., No. 262425, order at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo County May 25, 1988)
(insurers have no obligation to reimburse the government for costs expended in the cleanup of
the contamination because policy language limits insurers' obligation to claims for damages);
Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 292 So. 2d 75, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (no coverage for equitable claims for restoration of cemetery); Atlantic Wood Indus.,
Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., No. X87-1019-4, slip op. at 10 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 30, 1989)
(government claims for cleanup costs are not claims for damages); International Minerals &
Chem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., No. 84-L-50979, slip op. at 9-10 (Il1. Cir. Ct. Cook
County Jan. 6, 1987) (no coverage for the government claims that do not seek damages), aff'd,
168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 246 (11. 1988); Jones
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 172 Mich. App. 24, 29, 431 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1988) (according
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In Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemi-
cal Co. (NEPACCO),7 ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit wrestled with the question of whether the CGL policy covered gov-
ernment mandated cleanup costs.7 1 In NEPACCO, the insurer brought suit
against its insured, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend
or indemnify the insured in actions brought by governmental entities under
subsection 9607(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA.7 2 On rehearing en banc, Judge
McMillian, writing for the majority, held that cleanup costs were not dam-
to its plain and ordinary meaning, damages do not include strictly injunctive relief); Hoskins-
Western-Sonderegger, Inc. v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., No. 402, order at 5 (Neb. Dist. Ct.
Lancaster County Feb. 1, 1989) (response costs are not damages recoverable under the poli-
cies); County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 86-0342, slip op. at 21 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Broome County June 24, 1988) (no coverage for costs of instituting a remedial program),
aff'd on other grounds, 146 A.D.2d 337, 540 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1989); Lumberman's Underwriting
Alliance v. Atlantic Wood Indus., Inc., No. 86-L-350, letter order at I (Va. Cir. Ct. Henrico
County Oct. 7, 1988) (adopting the "better reasoned" opinions of Armco and Mraz). See also
Crist v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 529 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D. Utah 1982) (insurers have a duty
to defend claims for damages but not claims seeking injunctive relief); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 90 F.R.D. 405, 408 (D. Colo. 1981) (no coverage for attor-
neys' fees in suit for declaratory and injunctive relief); O'Neill Investigations v. Illinois Em-
ployers Ins. of Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Alaska 1981) (no coverage for an action
enjoining unlawful trade practices and seeking "as ancillary relief" restitution); Jaffe v.
Cranford Ins. Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 930, 935, 214 Cal. Rptr. 567, 571 (1985) (payments of
"restitutionary nature" are not damages); Board of Educ. v. Country Mut. Co., 121 Ill. App.
3d 124, 127, 459 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1984) (no coverage in suit for writ of mandamus and injunc-
tive relief); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 100 A.D.2d 820, 821, 474
N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (1984) (incidental expenses incurred as a result of complying with injunc-
tive provisions of consent judgment are not damages and are not covered under the policy);
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 740, 744,
504 P.2d 1139, 1143 (1973) (en banc) (no duty to defend suit for injunctive relief and restitu-
tion). Accord Travelers Ins. Co. v. Waltham Indus. Laboratories Corp., No. 87-0760-MA, slip
op. at 18 (D. Mass. Sept. 26, 1988) (because government action sought damages for injury to
natural resources as well as recovery of cleanup costs, insurer has a duty to defend the suit);
Home Indem. Co. v. City of Marianna, 291 Ark. 610, 616-18, 727 S.W.2d 375, 378-79 (1987)
(because the insuring agreement contained the limiting term "as damages" and the policy
endorsement did not mention damages, policy was ambiguous, and construing ambiguous pro-
visions against the insurer, court held that the policy covered injunctive and declaratory
relief).
70. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (5-3 decision), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988).
71. Id. at 983. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
ruled that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the CERCLA actions. No. 84-5034-
CV-S-4, slip op. at 10-11 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1985). The district court based its decision on
the occurrence language, and not on the meaning of damages, in the insurance policy at issue.
Because the damage or loss incurred by the Federal and State governmental entities occurred
after the expiration of the insurance policy, the court found that there was no "occurrence"
within the meaning of the liability insurance policy. Id. at 11. On appeal, a panel of the
Eighth Circuit considered the question of whether cleanup costs were recoverable under the
CGL policy. 811 F.2d 1180, 1181 (8th Cir. 1987) (panel decision). For a detailed discussion
of the panel decision, see infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
72. 842 F.2d at 981.
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ages within the meaning of the standard CGL policy.7 3 Although conceding
that environmental damage caused by improper disposal of hazardous
wastes could constitute property damage, Judge McMillian found that the
dispositive issue was whether cleanup costs fell within the meaning of dam-
ages.74 In examining the issue, the court determined that the term "dam-
ages" was not ambiguous and that its plain meaning in the insurance context
did not include equitable relief; it instead referred to legal damages." The
court reasoned that under the terms of the policy, the insurer was not liable
to pay all sums the insured was legally obligated to pay; but all sums the
insured was legally obligated to pay as damages. 76 Adopting a limited, tech-
nical interpretation of damages,77 Judge McMillian held that the govern-
ment claims for recovery of cleanup costs were equitable actions for
monetary relief in the form of restitution and were not claims for damages
under the CGL standard policy.7
Three judges disagreed with the majority's narrow, technical interpreta-
tion of the term "damages." 79 Judge Heaney, writing for the dissent, con-
tended that under Missouri law, if the language in an insurance policy was
73. Id. at 987.
74. Id. at 983.
75. Id. at 985. The court conceded that outside the insurance context, the word "dam-
ages" was ambiguous. Id. Because the dictionary definition of damages did not distinguish
between legal damages and equitable monetary relief, the court agreed that "from the view-
point of the lay insured, the term 'damages' [in a non-insurance context] could reasonably
include all monetary claims, whether such claims [were] described as damages, expenses, costs,
or losses." Id.
76. Id. at 986.
77. Id. The court justified its adoption of a limited interpretation of the term "damages"
by referring to the statutory scheme of section 9607(a)(4) of CERCLA, which differentiated
between recovery for cleanup costs and recovery for damages to natural resources. Id. The
court contended that the distinction between cleanup costs and damages was not "fortuitous"
and noted that there might be a significant difference between the liability for cleanup costs
and the damage to natural resources, thereby affecting whether the government sues for
cleanup costs or damages. Id. at 986-87 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822
F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988)).
78. 842 F.2d at 987. In September 1988, the District Court for the District of Columbia
followed NEPACCO and concluded that under policies governed by Missouri law, there was
"no coverage for governmental clean-up or response costs or injunctive relief." Independent
Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 83-3347, slip op. at 220 (D.D.C. Sept.
7, 1988). The court, however, ruled that as to certain insurance policies governed by New
York law, coverage existed for governmental cleanup costs. Id. at 221 (citing Kutsher's Coun-
try Club Corp. v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 119 Misc. 2d 889, 465 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1987) and
Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 8462/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 27, 1987), aff'd on
other grounds, 144 A.D.2d 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1988), appealgranted, 74 N.Y.2d 602, 541
N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989)).
79. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Judge Heaney was joined by
Chief Judge Lay and Judge Fagg. Id.
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ambiguous, the court must assign it a meaning understood by the ordinary
lay person who bought the policy.80 The dissent objected to the majority's
finding that the term "damages" was unambiguous .8  The dissent, more-
over, disagreed with the majority's decision to define the term "damages"
narrowly.82 Because the word "damages" was open to different construc-
tions, the dissent argued that it must be accorded the interpretation under-
stood by an ordinary lay person.8 3 Applying the broader interpretation, the
dissent concluded that the costs of restoring property to its predamaged
condition constituted damages.84
The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed the limiting inter-
pretation accorded the term "damages" and the distinction between equita-
ble monetary relief and legal damages in Bowen v. Massachusetts.85 Bowen, a
case outside the insurance context, involved a dispute over a federal district
court's jurisdiction to review a decision by the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services to withhold certain categories of
Medicaid expenses from state reimbursement. 86 In Bowen, the state re-
quested that the court enjoin the Secretary from refusing to reimburse the
state for medical expenses paid to eligible residents of health care facilities
for the mentally retarded.87 The Secretary argued that the federal court
lacked jurisdiction under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act
because the suit was not an action " 'seeking relief other than money dam-
ages'" within the meaning of section 702.88
The Supreme Court rejected the Secretary's argument and held that the
relief sought by the state was not a claim for money damages. 89 Recognizing
80. Id. at 988 (citing Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 637 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc)).
81. 842 F.2d at 988.
82. Id.
83. Id. The dissent objected further to the majority's reliance on Armco, stating that be-
cause the term "damages" was given a narrow, technical meaning under Maryland law, Mary-
land law was inconsistent with the law established in Missouri. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 989-
90. But cf supra note 43 (even if the terms are ambiguous, the rules of construction should not
apply if the insured is a sophisticated insured or if it is on the same bargaining level as the
insurer).
84. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 988 (citing Jack L. Baker Cos. v. Pasley Mfg. & Distrib. Co.,
413 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Mo. 1967)).
85. 108 S. Ct. 2722 (1988) (6-3 decision).
86. Id. at 2726.
87. Id. at 2728 & n.10.
88. Id. at 2730-31. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that a court
cannot dismiss an action which seeks relief "other than money damages" and which states that
an agency or officer of an agency "acted or failed to act in an official capacity" merely because
it is against the United States. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
89. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2735.
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the distinction between an action at law for damages and an equitable action
for specific relief,9° the Court noted that although money damages normally
referred to " 'a sum of money used as compensatory relief,' "91 a monetary
award could also be a specific remedy that was equitable in nature.92 But
whereas damages were a substitute for a loss suffered, equitable monetary
relief represented an attempt to restore the plaintiff to the status quo.9 3 The
Court concluded that relief which was essentially equitable in nature could
not be characterized as money damages merely because the remedy required
the payment of money. 94 Insurers, consequently, have relied upon the
Supreme Court's treatment of the distinction between monetary equitable
relief and legal damages to support their argument that monetary equitable
relief does not constitute damages within the meaning of the CGL policy. 95
2. Coverage for Cleanup Costs: A Broad Interpretation of Damages
The Court of Appeals of Michigan rejected the Hanna court's interpreta-
tion of damages.96 In United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
97
the Michigan Department of Natural Resources required Aviex, the insured,
to investigate and correct the contamination of groundwater caused by seep-
age of water used to extinguish a fire at the company's chemical manufactur-
ing facility.9" The insurer, interpreting damages as compensation for injury
or loss, argued that costs incurred as a result of complying with injunctive
orders were "noncompensatory." 99 Although the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals found this argument persuasive, ' it held that the insurer interpreted
90. Id. at 2731-32.
91. Id. at 2732 (quoting Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Department of Health
and Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2735.
95. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law of Commercial Union Insurance Company in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment at 32-34, Grisham v. Maryland Casualty Co., No. 88-3063
(W.D. Ark. filed Jan. 10, 1989).
96. United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838
(1983). /
97. Id.
98. Id. at 583, 336 N.W.2d at 840.
99. Id. at 588, 336 N.W.2d at 842.
100. Id. The insurer also argued that the policy did not cover damage to groundwater
beneath the insured's property because the policy explicitly excluded damages to "property
owned by the insured." Id. at 589, 336 N.W.2d at 843. The court rejected this argument and
held that because the property owner did not own the percolating water, the provision exclud-
ing coverage for damage to insured's property did not apply. Id.; see also Riehl v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1544, 1546 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (surface and subsurface water
on insured's property is not owned by insured), rev'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir.
1985). But see United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 200 (W.D. Mo.
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damages too narrowly. °1 After determining that groundwater contamina-
1986) (finding that although coverage existed for groundwater contamination to prevent fur-
ther damage to third parties, it did not exist for that "portion of the remedy [that] relates solely
to damage to the CCC site itself .... ); E.C. Electro Plating, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. L-
062919-85, slip op. at 2-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Bergen County Feb. 18, 1986) (finding
coverage for contamination to groundwater but ordering defendants to undertake discovery to
determine what portion of the remediation costs for groundwater purification are separate and
distinct from costs taken to clean up insured's own property).
101. Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 589, 336 N.W.2d at 843. A number of cases have followed
the Aviex court's rejection of the legal, technical definition of damages. See Avondale Indus.,
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 89-7035, slip op. at 17 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 1989) (noting that
the policy does not define damages, the court refused to accord the term a limited definition);
Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Indem. Co., No. 88-5723, slip op. at 20-21 (E.D. Pa. May 9,
1989) (disagreeing with NEPACCO and finding that the term "damages" in the standard CGL
policy includes cleanup costs); National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution Control, Inc.,
No. 88-656-W, order at 3 (W.D. Okla. May 1, 1989) (damages includes "monies sought under
CERCLA for response and clean-up of contamination"); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (under Pennsylvania law, damages in-
cludes certain equitable relief); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
704 F. Supp. 551, 560 (D. Del. 1989) (rejecting legal, technical definition, court held that
damages includes both legal and equitable remedies); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor
Lorentzen, Inc., No. 88-1994, slip op. at 6-8 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988) (construing damages ac-
cording to its ordinary meaning, court held that cleanup costs constitute damages); F.L. Aero-
space Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 87-CV-60070-AA, slip op. at 3-4 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 9, 1988) (finding that cleanup costs constitute damages); Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 454-55 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (costs of evaluat-
ing and cleaning up contaminated soil constitute damages); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Taxel, No. 87-336-S, slip op. at 10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 1988) (cleanup costs constitute "damages
because of property damage"); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F.
Supp. 342, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (even if the action is equitable in nature, costs incurred in
cleaning up property damage are damages within the CGL policy); New Castle County v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987) (legal, technical
definition of the word "damages" is inappropriate under Delaware law); Township of Glouces-
ter v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 399-400 (D.N.J. 1987) (cleanup costs consti-
tute damages); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (money spent to clean up environmental contamination constitutes damages); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 214 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (defining damages
as all sums which the insured is obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law); Aer-
ojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 973, 983, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 627
(1989) (insured may reasonably expect coverage for environmental cleanup costs); Union Oil
Co. of California v. Simon Mui, No. TR-617449-9, order at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda
County Jan. 30, 1989) (adopting a broad interpretation of damages and finding coverage for
cleanup costs); Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953, slip
op. at 75-76 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo County July 13, 1988) (tentative decision) (the word
"damages" has no special or technical meaning and damages can encompass cleanup costs,
abatement costs, prevention costs, and mitigation costs); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 391-92, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1080 (1989) (legal,
technical definition of damages is arbitrary and outdated and cleanup costs are essentially
compensatory damages recoverable under the policy); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., No. 86-MR-308, slip op. at 4 (Il. Cir. Ct. Lake County May 17, 1989) (bench ruling)
(rejecting a limited interpretation of damages); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., No. 86-1679, slip op. at 6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1989) (under a broad interpre-
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tion was "physical injury to tangible property" within the meaning of the
policy,'0 2 the court determined that if the state had sued for recovery of
damages for harm to the state's groundwater quality, including the recovery
of cleanup costs, the insurers would be obligated to pay damages."3 Under
the court's reasoning, the fact that the state required the plaintiff to clean up
the contamination rather than cleaning up the contamination itself and sub-
sequently suing for recovery of cleanup costs' °4 was insufficient to preclude
coverage because the damage to the natural resource was measured by the
cost of restoration. 0 5 Thus, the court ruled that the insurance policy cov-
ered cleanup costs.106
The District Court for the Western District of Michigan followed A viex
and adopted a broad interpretation of damages. 107 In United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 108 the insurers denied coverage,
tation of damages, cleanup costs constitute damages); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
No. 85-288651-CK, slip op. at 4 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oakland County Jan. 5, 1987) (cleanup costs
are recoverable damages), aff'd, No. 98969 (Mich. Ct. App. May 26, 1989); Diamond Sham-
rock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C-3939-84, slip op. at 21 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. Dec. 11, 1987) (bench ruling) (costs to cure environmental contamination are dam-
ages), rev'd on other grounds, 231 N.J. Super. 1, 554 A.2d 1342 (App. Div. 1989); City of
Farmington v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co., No. 87-271-1, order at 2 (N.M. Dist. Ct. San Juan
County Dec. 21, 1988) (adopting Aviex court's interpretation of damages); Sharon Steel Corp.
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C-87-2306, slip op. at 18-19 (Utah Dist. Ct. Salt Lake
County July 20, 1988) (under law of Utah, response costs incurred in order to remedy environ-
mental injury are covered damages); Queens City Farms, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
No. 86-2-06236-0, slip op. at 7 (Wash. Super. Ct. King County Jan. 15, 1988) (all sums ex-
pended to clean up and remedy groundwater contamination constitute damages).
102. Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 589, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
103. Id. at 589-90, 336 N.W.2d at 843. To reach this result, the court assumed that costs
the government expended in cleaning up environmental contamination constituted damages.
See id.
104. Id. at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
105. Id. (citing Chemical Applications Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 777 (D.
Mass. 1977); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d
520 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), certif denied,
73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977)). These cases, however, did not deal with the issue of whether
cleanup costs constituted damages within the meaning of the insurance policy. In Lansco, the
issue was whether the State of New Jersey had sustained property damage when oil leaked
from storage tanks onto the property. 138 N.J. Super. at 282-83, 350 A.2d at 524. The court,
without analyzing the meaning of the word "damages," concluded that the insurer was obli-
gated to indemnify Lansco for the costs of removal of the oil. Id. at 286, 350 A.2d at 526. The
court in Chemical Applications likewise did not discuss whether the cleanup costs incurred as a
result of an oil spill fell within the meaning of damages. In spite of this omission, the court
held that the insurer could not deny liability for costs of cleaning up the spill. 425 F. Supp. at
779-80.
106. Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
107. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D.
Mich.), vacated on other grounds, 683 F. Supp. at 1177 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
108. Id.
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claiming that the state and federal actions for recovery of response costs
pursuant to CERCLA were not damages on account of property damage.' 9
The court focused on the question of whether cleanup costs were sums the
insured was liable to pay because of property damage.' 10 Once the court
determined that environmental contamination caused property damage, it
held that cleanup costs were "sums the insured was liable to pay as a result
of property damage.""' Finding that the contractual understanding con-
trolled the question of "damages because of property damage," the court
reasoned that the insured was entitled to rely on "the common sense expec-
tation that property damage within the meaning of the policy include[d] a
claim which result[ed] in causing him to pay sums of money because his acts
or omissions affected adversely the rights of third parties." '112 The district
court maintained that although government claims for recovery of cleanup
costs might seek equitable relief, these claims were essentially compensatory
damages for injury to common property and were covered under the CGL
policy. 1"
3
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
also refused to construe the term "damages" narrowly. In Intel Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 114 the insured entered into a consent
decree with the United States Environmental Protection Agency, which re-
quired the insured to pay remedial and response costs in the cleanup of a site
that had suffered both soil and groundwater contamination.' 15 In its initial
discussion of coverage, the court rejected a superior court decision from Los
Angeles County, which held that reimbursement for response costs did not




113. Id. See also Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England v. Midland Ins. Co., No. L-
25610-83, op. at 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 17, 1986) (noting that the key issue was the
essential nature of damages and not whether the government sought compensatory or equita-
ble relief, court held that cleanup costs are essentially compensatory damages recoverable
under the insurance policy), rev'd on other grounds, 218 N.J. Super. 49, 526 A.2d 1112 (App.
Div. 1987); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 80, 93,
323 S.E.2d 726, 735 (1984) (although equitable relief, costs to prevent further harm are
strongly remedial and are therefore "essentially compensatory damages for injury to common
property"), rev'd on other grounds, 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986). But see Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D. Md. 1986) (insurer was not obligated
to defend or indemnify hypothetical suits but rather "real" ones), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
73 Ill. App. 3d 43, 48, 391 N.E.2d 568, 572-73 (1979) (court's speculation as to whether to
award damages when none are sought will alter the obligation of the insurer as set forth in the
insurance policy).
114. 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
115. Id. at 1173.
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constitute property damage within the meaning of the insurance policy." 6
The district court specifically rejected the superior court's reliance on Armco
and found that the state court "offer[ed] nothing in the way of independent
analysis or an evaluation of the competing approaches to the issue."'' 7 Not-
ing that the California appellate courts had not spoken on this issue, the
district court accepted responsibility for determining the course of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court."'
The district court first held that damage to underground water was dam-
age to tangible property." 9 Once the court determined that the insured had
injured property of a third party, it addressed the issue of whether the
cleanup of contamination to that property constituted damages within the
terms of the policy. 2 ' Emphasizing that state law was dispositive of the
issue,12 ' the court rejected the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' narrow definition
of damages.12 2 Applying California law, the court ruled that where the peo-
ple and State of California had suffered h detriment from the unlawful acts
or omissions of the insured, they were entitled to damages. 12  The court
116. Id. at 1184 (citing Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Union Oil Co., No. C-514-
463, slip op. at 3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Nov. 24, 1987)).
117. Id. at 1185.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1185-86. The district court expressly followed decisions applying the laws of
Oregon, Michigan, and Puerto Rico. Id. at 1185. See Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins.
Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the Oregon Supreme Court
would have held that discharge of pollution into water caused damage to tangible property);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (following
Aviex and applying Michigan law); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich.
App. 579, 589, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983) (contamination of groundwater as a result of fire
was physical injury to tangible property); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 85-
288651-CK, slip op. at 10 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oakland County Jan. 5, 1987) (under Puerto Rico
law, damage caused by chemical spill was damage to property of third persons), aff'd, No.
98969 (Mich. Ct. App. May 26, 1989).
120. Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1186.
121. Id. at 1189.
122. Id. at 1186-87. The district court criticized the Mraz court because it based its analy-
sis concerning the definition of property damage on federal law, rather than on relevant Mary-
land precedent. Id. In addition, the court maintained that although the Fourth Circuit in
Armco attempted to apply the law of the forum state, it failed to do so. Id. But while the Intel
court agreed with the Eighth Circuit's finding in NEPACCO that the law of the forum state
applied, it disagreed with the majority's holding that cleanup costs did not constitute damages
within the meaning of the CGL policy. Id. at 1188 & n.24.
123. Id. at 1189. The court based its holding on the California Civil Code. California Civil
Code section 3281 provides: "Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or
omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor [sic] in
money, which is called damages." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3281 (West 1989). Noting that the
statutory definition of "detriment" was "loss or harm suffered in person or property", the
court found that "detriment" was synonymous with "damage" under California law. 692 F.
Supp. at 1189 n.25 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 3282 (West 1989)).
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found that the insured was legally obligated to pay all costs of cleanup,
124
including costs incurred to prevent and mitigate damage to third parties.
125
124. Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1190.
125. Id. at 1194. Some courts have held that the CGL policy covers costs incurred as a
result of preventing environmental contamination to adjacent property, even though the policy
excludes "damages to property owned or occupied by or rented to the insured" or "property in
the care, custody or control of the insured." See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co.,
713 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1989) (owned property exclusion does not bar coverage for costs
incurred as a result of cleaning up environmental contamination that "presented a demon-
strated danger to the property of another"); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662
F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (owned property exclusion does not preclude coverage
where the government claims allege property damage to third parties); Township of Gloucester
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 400 (D.N.J. 1987) (cleanup costs are not ex-
cluded from coverage on the basis of the owned property exclusion because costs of repairing
insured's property are inextricably linked to the government claims for cleanup of property of
third parties); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, No. 84-2609, slip
op. at 11-12 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1986) (expenditures incurred to clean up and mitigate harm to
third parties are recoverable under the policy, even though these expenditures may be ex-
pended in part to clean up insured's own property), aff'd, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988); Riehl v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1544, 1546 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (groundwater is not
property owned by insured and abatement costs to prevent future pollution are damages within
the meaning of the policy), rev'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (coverage for
work performed to prevent oil seepage from continuing), vacated on other grounds, 621 F.
Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 85-288651-CK, slip
op. at 10 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5, 1987) (coverage for costs of purifying groundwater contami-
nated by spill even though the spillage may be removed from the insured's own property),
aff'd, No. 98969 (Mich. Ct. App. May 26, 1989); CPS Chem. Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
222 N.J. Super. 175, 188, 536 A.2d 311, 317 (App. Div. 1988) (insurers are obligated to indem-
nify insured for sums the insured incurred as a result of abating the migration of contaminants
where migration is continuous and peril to health and the environment is immediate); Broad-
well Realty Serv. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 527-28, 528 A.2d 76,
82 (App. Div. 1987) (abatement measures performed to prevent continued destruction of adja-
cent property constitute recoverable damages where contamination is continuous and ongoing
and where peril is imminent and immediate); New Jersey v. Signo Trading Int'l, Inc., No. C-
2995-83, slip op. at 33-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 25, 1988) (bench ruling) (same); E.C.
Electro Plating, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. L-062919-85, slip. op. at 2-3 (N.J. Super. Law
Div. Bergen County Feb. 18, 1986) (coverage for liability resulting from discharge, including
costs necessary to clean the environment and prevent future environmental harm); Leebov v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 401 Pa. 477, 480, 165 A.2d 82, 84 (1960) (policy covers
expenses incurred to prevent damage from landslip); Lehigh Elec. & Eng'g Co. v. Selected
Risks Ins. Co., 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 120, 126-27 (Ct. C.P. 1982) (costs incurred as a result of
preventing or mitigating damage to property are covered under the policy where the release of
hazardous substances has caused an imminent and substantial danger to property of third
parties); Aronson Assocs. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 1, 8
(Ct. C.P. 1977) (insured has a legal obligation to take measures to prevent seepage of gasoline
into underground water supplies), aff'd, 272 Pa. Super. 606, 422 A.2d 689 (1979). Accord
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 200 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (coverage to
prevent further damage to third parties and no coverage to remedy damage confined to in-
sured's own property); Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, No.
278953, slip op. at 73 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo County July 13, 1988) (tentative decision)
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The court concluded that the California Supreme Court would hold that all
costs expended by the insured in investigating and cleaning up pollution that
posed an established threat to public health were covered under the CGL
policy. 
126
Chesapeake Utilities Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co. 127 represents
another departure from the application of a legal, technical definition of
damages. In Chesapeake Utilities, the States of Maryland and Delaware as-
serted environmental claims128 against the insured for remedial and response
action at a Maryland site.29 and for costs incurred in the cleanup of a Dela-
ware site. 3° With regard to the Maryland site, the insurers argued that be-
(coverage for remedial measures taken on insured's property where remedial measures are
necessary to prevent imminent harm to third parties and no coverage for response costs ex-
pended solely to clean up insured's property); Lido Co. of New England, Inc. v. Firemans
Fund Ins. Co., CV-87-428, order at 1-2 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1989) (insurer is not obligated
to reimburse the insured for costs expended solely in the cleanup of the insured's own prop-
erty); Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 231 N.J. Super. 1, 15-16,
554 A.2d 1342, 1350 (App. Div. 1989) (remanded for a determination as to whether there is a
threat of damage to property of third parties); Summit Assocs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 229 N.J. Super. 56, 64, 550 A.2d 1235, 1239 (App. Div. 1988) (remanded for a determina-
tion as to whether the threatened damage to third parties is imminent and immediate or
whether it is "an undefined and speculative future loss" excluded from coverage); Atlantic City
Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Cigna Cos., No. A-1320-84T7, slip op. at 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Dec. 19, 1985) (no coverage where measures protected insured's own property and its under-
ground water supply against threat of contamination in distant future). But cf Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (4th Cir. 1987) (CGL policy does not
provide coverage for measures taken to prevent potential injury to property), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 703 (1988); Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129, 132, 106 A.2d 196, 198
(1954) (insurer not obligated to reimburse the insured for contingent and prospective injuries).
126. Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1192. Intel subsequently moved for summary judgment, seeking
a declaration that the insurer must reimburse it for all past damages incurred in the investiga-
tion and cleanup of the contamination. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No.
C-87-20434 RPA, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 1988). The district court denied the re-
quest for a lump sum reimbursement, holding that an evidentiary hearing was required for a
determination of the "reimburseable damages." Id. at 13-14. In particular, the court deter-
mined that the insurer was not required to pay for those expenses pertaining solely to damage
to the insured's own property. Id. at 11. Moreover, the court suggested that the insurer was
not obligated to pay all costs expended in an investigation into the scope of an injury. Id. at
13-14.
127. 704 F. Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989).
128. The State of Maryland demanded that Chesapeake Utilities investigate the potential
contamination of groundwater beneath the Maryland site. Id. at 553. Chesapeake Utilities
incurred costs as a result of remedying the pollution. Id. at 553-54. The State of Maryland,
however, did not bring a lawsuit against Chesapeake. Id. at 553 n.5. The district court noted
that the state could have brought an action against Chesapeake Utilities pursuant to CER-
CLA. Id. Whereas the State of Maryland did not expend costs in cleaning up the Maryland
site, the State of Delaware incurred costs in monitoring and cleaning up the Delaware site. Id.
at 554. The State of Delaware also did not file suit against Chesapeake Utilities. Id. at 554 n.7.
129. Id. at 553-54.
130. Id. at 554.
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cause the insured's remedial actions were equitable remedies, and not
damages, the costs of those activities were not covered under the insurance
policies at issue."' The insurers similarly argued that the costs incurred in
the cleanup of the Delaware site did not constitute damages within the
meaning of the policies.
132
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware rejected the
insurers' arguments and held that, under the laws of both Maryland and
Delaware, 133 cleanup costs constituted damages.' 34  In determining the
existence of coverage for remedies sought by the State of Maryland, the dis-
trict court refused to follow Armco, claiming that Armco misstated Mary-
land law.' 35 Under Maryland law, the court must interpret unambiguous
terms in an insurance contract according to their plain and ordinary mean-
ing. 3 6 Where, however, the terms are ambiguous, the court will construe
the policy language against the insurer.' 37 When language in an insurance
policy is susceptible to more than one meaning, the court will find it ambigu-
ous. 1' Applying these rules of construction, the court found that the word
"damages" was ambiguous and that it must therefore construe the term
against the insurer.'3 9 Thus, the district court, without defining the term
131. Id. at 555.
132. Id.
133. The court determined that Maryland law governed those claims pertaining to the
Maryland site, while Delaware law controlled the claims relating to the Delaware site. Id. at
557.
134. Id. at 560, 565.
135. Id. at 558.
136. Id. at 559.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 560.
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"damages," rejected the legal, technical definition adopted in Armco 140 and
held that legal and equitable relief fell within the term "damages."'
14 1
B. Insurance Coverage for Damages Because of Property Damage
Courts are also divided on the second argument advanced by the insur-
ance companies against coverage for cleanup costs; namely, that cleanup
costs are not the measure of property damage. Some courts have held that
government claims for cleanup costs pursuant to CERCLA are not claims
for property damage within the meaning of the insurance policy.' 42 Several
140. Id. The district court noted that even if the term "damages" was unambiguous, it
should accord the word a plain and ordinary meaning, not the legal, technical meaning
adopted by Armco. Id. at 559-60. The court reasoned that a definition based on the distinction
between law and equity was not a meaning a reasonable lay person could ordinarily infer. Id.
at 560; see also FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058, slip op. at 16 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Santa Clara County Jan. 3, 1989) (ordinary lay person cannot be expected to understand the
"fine distinctions between law and equity"). The court, in applying the plain and ordinary
meaning to the term, construed the word "damages" according to the reasonable expectations
doctrine, that is, what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have under-
stood the term to mean. Chesapeake Utils., 704 F. Supp. at 560; see also Avondale Indus. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., No. 86-9626 (KC), slip op. at 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1988) (constru-
ing damages according to the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary businessman,
court found coverage for cleanup costs), aff'd, No. 89-7035 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 1989); New
Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987)
(court rejected legal, technical definition of damages in Armco and adhered to reasonable ex-
pectation of insured); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 650 F. Supp.
1553, 1560-61 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (construing damages in accordance with the plain meaning of
the term and the reasonable expectations of the insured, court held that an award for back pay
constitutes damages); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 973, 983,
257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 627 (1989) (insured can reasonably conclude that policy covered "environ-
mental cleanup costs, imposed upon it by the government to remedy and prevent property
damage, as well as traditional legal damages"); Globe Indem. Co. v. California, 43 Cal. App.
3d 745, 751, 118 Cal. Rptr. 75, 79 (1974) (interpreting the policy according to the reasonable
and normal expectations of the insured, the court determined that costs expended to suppress a
fire are recoverable sums the insured is liable to pay because of property damage); Broadwell
Realty Serv. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 218 N.J. Super. 516, 526, 528 A.2d 76,
81 (App. Div. 1987) (court determined that a finding of coverage for expenses the insured
incurred to prevent continued release of hazardous substances onto property of third parties is
consistent with reasonable expectations of insured).
141. Chesapeake Utils., 704 F. Supp. at 560. Similarly, the court held that under Delaware
law, cleanup costs are damages. Id. at 565 (relying on New Castle County v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987)).
142. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Idaho
1989) (response cost liability under CERCLA is not based upon the existence of property
damage); Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Insurance Co. of Pa., No. C-514-463, slip op.
at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Nov. 24, 1987) (finding that the language of the
policy pertains to "damage to property in the traditional sense" and holding that response
costs are not the measure of property damage).
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courts, in contrast, have concluded that cleanup costs are recoverable sums
the insured is liable to pay because of property damage.' 43
1. No Coverage for Environmental Contamination: The Nature of the
Relief Sought in the CERCLA Actions
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the underlying government actions sought damages for
property damage.'" The court, in Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance
Co.,' 45 first questioned whether the Federal and State governments sought
relief for the contamination of the site at issue or whether they merely al-
leged a factual basis for reimbursement of cleanup costs.'46 The Fourth Cir-
cuit differentiated between the nature of the relief sought in the underlying
government suits, namely the recovery of cleanup or response costs under
CERCLA subsection 9607(a)(4)(A),' 4 7 and the recovery of actual damage to
natural resources permitted under subsection 9607(a)(4)(C), 14  which the
Federal and State governments did not seek in the underlying complaints. 4 9
Although the underlying complaints alleged that property damage occurred,
the property damage allegations did not form the basis of the relief sought.
Rather, the governments requested reimbursement of cleanup costs.' 50 Em-
phasizing that property damage and response costs were independent, the
court determined that it could not equate response costs with the definition
of property damage contained in the insurance policy at issue.' 51 Because
the underlying government complaints did not allege a claim of property
143. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
144. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1329. The Fourth Circuit criticized the lower court's analysis of coverage. See
id. at 1329-30. In Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland rejected the insurer's claim that reimbursement of cleanup costs incurred
at a hazardous waste dump site was not on account of property damage within the meaning of
the liability insurance policy. 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (D. Md. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Mraz v.
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 824 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986). The district court found that
water contamination was property damage for insurance purposes. Id. Because the underly-
ing suit alleged that the leakage from drums dumped at the site caused contamination of soil
and water which necessitated cleanup, the court concluded that the complaint alleged property
damage and that the insurer's duty to defend the underlying government suit was triggered.
Id.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
148. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
149. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328-29.
150. Id. at 1329.
151. Id. The definition of property damage contained in Canadian Universal's policy pro-
vided that property damage was " 'injury to or destruction of tangible property.' " Id.
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damage, but rather an economic loss,' 5 2 the court concluded there was no
insurance coverage for the cleanup of the hazardous waste disposal site.' 53
2. Coverage for Environmental Contamination: The Measure of
Property Damage
In Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 1 4 the insurer
denied coverage for costs incurred by the insured as a result of cleaning up
an oil spill.' 55 Reading the term "property damage" to mean "measurable
damage to identifiable physical property,"' 56 the insurer claimed that cover-
age did not extend to sums the state had recovered from the insured to clean
up environmental contamination."' The court found that this argument
was without merit and recognized that the state had a right to obtain dam-
152. Courts have held that strict economic losses do not constitute property damage under
the terms of the CGL policy. See, e.g., 11 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 44.287
(rev. ed. 1982) ("[s]trictly economic losses ... are not damage or injury to tangible property
and do not constitute the requisite property damage."). See also Lassen Canyon Nursery, Inc.
v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 720 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1983) (economic losses, such as lost
profits or good will, are not property damage); Lazzara Oil Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 683
F. Supp. 777, 780-81 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (economic losses do not constitute injury to tangible
property), aff'd without opinion, 868 F.2d 1274 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp.
v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 792, 796-97 (E.D. Va. 1978) (installation of
defective supports in a nuclear power plant not yet constructed does not constitute property
damage), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1980); McCollum v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 132
Ariz. 129, 132, 644 P.2d 283, 286 (Ct. App. 1982) (no coverage for lost profits on land
purchases); Giddings v. Industrial Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 3d 213, 219, 169 Cal. Rptr. 278,
281 (1980) (strict economic losses, such as lost profits, loss of goodwill, loss of investment, do
not constitute property damage); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co.,
No. 84-CH- 11676, slip. op. at 7 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug. 14, 1987) (no allegation of
property damage because the cost of inspection, removal, and replacement of asbestos products
is an economic loss); CMO Graphics, Inc. v. CNA Ins., 115 Il. App. 3d 491, 496-97, 450
N.E.2d 860, 863-64 (1983) (same); County of Monroe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 100 Misc. 2d 417,
419, 419 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1979) (cost of performing additional
work because of collapse of construction project does not constitute property damage), aff'd,
75 A.D.2d 1025 (1980); Hobson Constr. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., .71 N.C. App. 586, 591,
322 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1984) (costs of repairing dam are not based on property damage), review
denied, 313 N.C. 329, 327 S.E.2d 890 (1985).
153. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1329. In March 1989, the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho followed the reasoning in Mraz and held that because liability of the insured
for cleanup costs was not based on the existence of property damage, the policy did not cover
these costs. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958,
961 (D. Idaho 1989).
154. 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368
A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), certif denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
155. Id. at 280, 350 A.2d at 523. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion requested that Lansco undertake the cleanup efforts. Id. at 279, 350 A.2d at 522.
156. Id. at 282, 350 A.2d at 524.
157. Id.
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ages for injuries to natural resources as well as to the environment. 15 8 Be-
cause Lansco could have reasonably expected indemnification for claims
arising out of the operation of its business not otherwise excluded from the
policy, the court found that the insurer had an obligation to pay Lansco for
cleanup costs. 159 The court concluded that the amount Lansco was legally
obligated to pay to the state, and therefore the amount of the insurer's obli-
gation to indemnify Lansco, was determined by the cost of cleaning up the
spill.'" ° In so holding, the court rejected the insurer's definition of property
damage.
A panel decision of the Eighth Circuit similarly determined that cleanup
costs are the measure of property damage. In Continental Insurance Co. v.
158. Id. at 283, 350 A.2d at 524.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 284, 350 A.2d at 525. Lansco established a basis upon which other courts have
relied in holding that cleanup costs are damages because of property damage. See, e.g., Uni-
gard Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty's, Inc., No. 83-1441, slip op. at 5 (D. Idaho June 5, 1987)
(where government alleges soil contamination, cleanup costs cannot be excluded from cover-
age on the basis of the property damage provisions); Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins.
Syndicate, 549 F. Supp. 233, 235 (D. Or. 1982) (adopting the " 'reasonable, enlightened
view' " of Lansco that environmental pollution constitutes property damage), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 796 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1986); Chemical Applications Co. v. Home Indem. Co.,
425 F. Supp. 777, 778 (D. Mass. 1977) (costs of removing oil spill in navigable waters consti-
tutes property damage); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., No. 84-
L-51188, slip op. at 9 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County Nov. 16, 1987) (government actions for recov-
ery of cleanup costs have alleged property damage within the definition of the policy), aff'd,
180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989); Kearsarge Metallurgical Corp. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., No. E-83-460, order at 7-8 (N.H. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 1986) (finding coverage for injunctive
relief which sought "compensation to remedy injury" to groundwater); Solvents Recovery
Serv. of New England v. Midland Ins. Co., No. L-25610-83, slip op. at 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Nov. 17, 1986) (bench ruling) (all costs incurred in the cleanup of hazardous waste site
are property damage or costs incurred because of property damage), aff'd, 218 N.J. Super. 49,
526 A.2d 1112 (App. Div. 1987); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 8462/85, slip
op. at 4 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Nassau County Apr. 27, 1987) (costs of complying with governmen-
tal order which are attributed to restoring groundwater and environment to a precontamina-
tion state and preventing future contamination constitute damages within the meaning of the
policy), modifiedon other grounds, 144 A.D.2d 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1988), appealgranted,
74 N.Y.2d, 541 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989); Kutsher's Country Club Corp. v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 119
Misc. 2d 889, 893, 465 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1983) (following Lansco);
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C-87-2306, slip op. at 20 (Utah Dist. Ct.
Salt Lake County July 20, 1988) (coverage for response costs sought by the government to
remedy property damage); Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 86-2-
06236-0, slip op. at 5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1988) (groundwater contamination constitutes
covered property damage); Wagner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 609, 613 n.3, 427
N.W.2d 854, 856 n.3 (Ct. App. 1988) (where property damage has occurred, cleanup costs
necessitated by that damage are covered under the policy); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dar-
gan & Co., 748 P.2d 724, 727-28 (Wyo. 1988) (oil spill resulting in contamination of third
parties' property constitutes property damage).
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NEPACCO, 6 ' Circuit Judge Heaney, writing for a panel of the court, dis-
agreed with the insurer's contention that the injury suffered by the govern-
mental entities from the improper disposal was an economic loss. '6 2 Finding
that Federal and State governments had property interests in wildlife, water,
and natural resources, the court determined that damage to tangible prop-
erty such as land, trees, air, and water fell within the definition of property
damage.163 The court concluded that damage to the environment caused by
the dumping of toxic wastes was property damage" 4 and that cleanup costs
were a measure of that damage.' 6 - Thus, once the court found that property
damage occurred, it held that cleanup costs were recoverable as sums the
insured was legally obligated to pay as damages because of property
damage. '
66
Insurance coverage for government mandated cleanup costs, however, is
not based solely on a determination of whether cleanup costs are the mea-
sure of property damage. On rehearing en banc,' 67 the Eighth Circuit deter-
mined that while the improper disposal of hazardous waste could cause
environmental damage, the dispositive issue was whether cleanup costs con-
stituted damages. 16' Because the court ruled that cleanup costs did not fall
within the meaning of the term "damages," thereby precluding coverage, 1
69
the court did not consider the issue of whether cleanup costs were the mea-
sure of property damage.'7 ° Had the Eighth Circuit reached the contrary
result, namely, that damages included cleanup costs and other equitable re-
lief, it would appear that the court would have then addressed the second
161. 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir.) (panel decision), reh'gen banc granted, 815 F.2d 51 (8th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988).
162. 811 F.2d at 1184.
163. Id. at 1186.
164. Id. at 1189 (relying, inter alia, on the reversed decision in Mraz v. American Univer-
sal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Md. 1985) (because the underlying government
complaint alleged that the release of the insured's wastes caused contamination of soil and
water resulting in the need for cleanup, it alleged property damage), rev'd sub nom. Mraz v.
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986)).
165. Id. at 1188-89. The panel justified its conclusion that cleanup costs were a measure of
damages to property by looking at the CERCLA provisions and the language of the CGL
policies at issue. With regard to section 9607(a)(4) of CERCLA, the court stated that,
although subsection 9607(a)(4)(C) directly provided for damage to natural resources, subsec-
tions (A) and (B) were measures of the damages to natural resources that the government was
entitled to recover. Id. at 1188.
166. Id. at 1189.
167. Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 66 (1988).
168. Id. at 983.
169. Id. at 987.
170. Id. at 983.
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issue of whether the government complaint sought compensation for injury
to property.
III. RESOLVING THE DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA: THE SPECIFIC
MEANING OF POLICY TERMS
To resolve the question of insurance coverage for government mandated
cleanup costs, courts have addressed two issues. The first issue pertains to
the nature of the relief sought and concerns whether cleanup costs are legal
damages within the meaning of the comprehensive general liability insurance
policy.' 7 ' Second, where courts have found that the government sought re-
lief that constitutes damages, courts have considered whether cleanup costs
are the measure of property damage (i.e., damages because of property dam-
age).72 In order for the CGL policy to provide coverage, courts must find
both damages and property damage.173
Under the terms of the CGL policy, the insured must establish that the
costs the insured seeks to recover are damages within the meaning of the
policy and that the insured owes these damages because of property dam-
age. 7 4 Without a finding of damages, there is no coverage.' 7 5 Similarly,
assuming damages includes cleanup costs, if the government has not alleged
a claim of property damage, the insurer is not obligated to reimburse the
insured under the provisions of the policy.'7 6 Courts, by concluding that
cleanup costs do not constitute damages, however, need not reach the second
issue presented; that is, whether the reimbursement of cleanup costs is on
account of property damage.' 77 Unfortunately, in an effort to resolve these
questions, some courts have not considered the issue of covered damages and
have settled the dispute based on their interpretation of property damage.' 7 8
The dichotomy in the case law has therefore left both insurers and insureds
171. See supra notes 69 and 101.
172. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
173. See Soderstrom, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
174. See generally id.
175. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 983 (8th Cir.) (the ques-
tion of whether cleanup costs constitute damages is dispositive), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66
(1988).
176. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that response costs are an economic loss, not damage to tangible property); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Idaho 1989)
(liability for CERCLA cleanup costs is not based upon a claim of property damage).
177. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 983.
178. See, e.g., Chemical Applications Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mass.
1977); Lansco v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), certif denied, 73 N.J.
57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
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uncertain about the potential liability of the insurance companies for ex-
penditures incurred in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
A. Cleanup Costs Do Not Constitute Legal Damages
The standard CGL policy defines the obligation of the insurer to pay on
behalf of the insured sums incurred in connection with the cleanup of envi-
ronmental contamination. 179 The policy provides that the insurer must pay
"all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay as damages
because of ... property damage ... 180 The insurer, according to this
provision, has not agreed to pay "all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay."'' To the contrary, the insurer has agreed to in-
demnify the insured for all sums the insured is legally required to pay "as
damages."' 82 The term "damages", therefore, limits the "all sums" provi-
sion in the policy; damages provides the key to the obligation of the insurer
to pay all sums imposed upon the insured by law on account of property
damage. 1
8 3
Because the CGL policy does not define damages, courts are often left
with the task of interpreting the meaning of the term. If the word "dam-
ages" is deemed ambiguous, courts construe the language against the author
of the contract, in this case the insurer, as the applicable state law generally
requires.' 84 This has led courts that have found an ambiguity in the term to
hold that "damages" includes cleanup costs.' 8 ' Where courts find the lan-
guage unambiguous, however, damages is given its plain and ordinary mean-
ing. "' While some courts, interpreting the term "damages" according to its
plain and ordinary meaning, hold that cleanup costs are covered damages, 1
87
others recognize that, in the insurance context, the word has a special, tech-
179. See Soderstrom, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
180. Id.
181. See NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d
1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
182. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
183. See, e.g., United States Aviex v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 588, 336
N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983).
184. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359,
1365 (D. Del. 1987) (applying Delaware law); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., No. C-87-2366, slip op. at 17-18 (Utah Dist. Ct. Salt Lake County July 20, 1988) (apply-
ing Utah law).
185. New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365; Sharon Steel, No. C-87-2366, slip op. at 18.
186. See, e.g., Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352 (applying Maryland law); Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (applying Florida law).
187. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, No. 84-2609,
slip op. at 9, 12 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1986), aff'd, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988); Queen City Farms,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 86-2-06236-0, slip op. at 7 (Wash. Super. Ct. King
County Jan. 15, 1988).
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nical meaning that precludes coverage for cleanup costs."' 8 Thus, whether
courts recognize the accepted legal, technical definition of damages has be-
come an issue central to the determination of an insurer's defense or indem-
nification obligation for CERCLA suits.
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have given a specific meaning to
the word "damages" which precludes coverage for sums payable as a result
of compliance with equitable remedies. 189 Recognizing that the term "dam-
ages" is plain and unambiguous, the Armco and Hanna courts accorded a
limited, technical meaning to the term.' 9° Although conceding that the
term is ambiguous outside the insurance context, the Eighth Circuit found
that "damages" is unambiguous in the insurance context' 9 ' and applied a
special definition to the term.' 92 While not expressly rejecting the rule of
construction that unambiguous terms are accorded a plain meaning, these
courts have limited the scope of sums payable as damages.19
1. Legal, Technical Definition of Damages
The application of a limited interpretation of damages in the insurance
context is, by no means, unfounded. In particular, the obligations of the
insured and insurer as set forth in the policy support a limited interpretation
of the term. The standard CGL policy expressly limits the insurer's obliga-
tion to pay to all sums payable "as damages."' 94 As the courts in Hanna
and Armco have recognized, the policy covers only money paid to third par-
ties when those persons have a legal claim for damages against the insured
because of property damage.'9 5 The Eighth Circuit, as well as the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, have determined that, to be covered under the CGL pol-
icy, government actions brought against the insured pursuant to CERCLA
must constitute a claim for damages.' 96 Where the government actions seek
equitable relief, there is no coverage under the terms of the policy, since
sums payable as a result of compliance with equitable remedies are not sums
payable as damages.' 97 Thus, the distinction between a claim for damages
188. Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 66 (1988); Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
189. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Armco 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503. See
also Miller v. Weller, 288 F.2d 438, 439 (3d Cir. 1961) (stating that "'damages' ... is a word
of art with a rather definite meaning"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961).
190. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
191. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985.
192. Id.
193. Id.; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
194. See NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985.
195. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
196. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986-87; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
197. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986-87; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
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and a claim for equitable relief is dispositive for a determination of
coverage. 98
In a suit for damages, money is awarded to the plaintiff as a substitute for
the loss or injury sustained.' 99 Damages represents compensatory relief; it is
remedial, not preventive. 2" The recovery of costs the government paid to
clean up pollution, in contrast, represents the specific relief of restitution.2 °1
The recovery of cleanup costs will not remedy the injury sustained; rather, a
claim for cleanup cost recovery is designed to reimburse the government for
restoring the contaminated property to its status quo.202 Accordingly, a
claim for reimbursement of cleanup costs is not a claim for damages. 2 3 It is
a claim for equitable relief, not recoverable under the standard CGL
policy.
2 °4
Some courts have rejected the legal, technical definition of damages, opin-
ing that the distinction between a claim for legal damages and a claim for
equitable relief is unconvincing. 20 5 These courts have determined that
although government claims for recovery of cleanup costs can be character-
ized as equitable relief, "cleanup costs are essentially compensatory damages
for injury to common property. ' 20 6 Because government claims require the
payment of money for acts or omissions of the insured that adversely affect
property of third parties, the claims, in the view of these courts, seek dam-
198. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 983.
199. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S. Ct. 2722, 2732 (1988) (citing Maryland Dep't of
Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1446 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)); Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503; Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129, 131,
106 A.2d 196, 198 (1954).
200. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2732, (citing Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at
1446); Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503; Desrochers, 99 N.H. at 131, 106 A.2d at 198.
201. See Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
202. Id. at 1352-53; see also Desrochers, 99 N.H. at 131, 106 A.2d at 198.
203. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353; see also Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (suit for declaratory
and injunctive relief is an equitable action which seeks reimbursement of funds to which the
state is already entitled and which does not seek compensatory relief); Haines v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435, 441 (D. Md. 1977) (in a Securities and Exchange Com-
mission action, restitution and disgorgement constitute equitable relief outside the coverage
provided by the policy).
204. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988); Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
205. See supra note 101.
206. Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 80, 93,323 S.E.2d
726, 735 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986); see also United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich.),
vacated on other grounds, 683 F. Supp. at 1177 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Kearsarge Metallurgical
Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. E-83-460, slip op. at 7 (N.H. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 1986); Sol-
vents Recovery Serv. of New England v. Midland Ins. Co., No. L-25610-83, slip op. at 23 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 17, 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 218 N.J. Super. 49, 526 A.2d 1112
(App. Div. 1987).
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ages from the insured, and these damages are recoverable under the terms of
the policy.
207
However, the mere fact that the government seeks money from the in-
sured does not mean that the government's claim is a claim for damages.20
In Bowen v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
fundamental distinction between legal damages and equitable forms of mon-
etary relief and emphasized: "The fact that a judicial remedy may require
one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize
the relief as 'money damages.' ",209 Similarly acknowledging the distinction
between legal damages and monetary equitable relief, numerous courts have
held that equitable relief, including equitable remedies that seek the payment
of money, does not fall within the definition of damages.210 Coverage, ac-
cording to the terms of the CGL policy, does not extend to the insured's
liabilities of an equitable nature.21
Courts have precluded coverage for equitable remedies against the insured
even in cases where claims could have been brought for damages.212 To
equate equitable monetary relief with money damages for the purpose of
finding coverage would result in a broadening of the provisions in the stan-
dard CGL policy. 213 If the term "damages" is accorded a broad meaning,
which would include claims for equitable relief as well as claims for legal
damages, then the word "damages". "would become mere surplusage.
' 214
By requiring the insurer to pay "all sums," some courts have eliminated the
limitation that the term "damages" employed 2 5 and have effectively altered
the obligations of the insurer as set forth in the policy. 21 6 Insurance compa-
207. Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 561 (D.
Del. 1989); Thomas Solvent, 683 F. Supp. at 1168. Contra Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco,
Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 435 (D. Md. 1986) (cleanup costs cannot be essentially damages for
purposes of interpreting an insurance contract and equitable for purposes of the seventh
amendment), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
208. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S. Ct. 2722, 2732 (1988).
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988); Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna,
224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955).
211. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
212. See, e.g., NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503; Armco, 643 F. Supp.
430, 434 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987); Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 292 So. 2d 75, 76-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Ladd Constr. Co. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 73 11. App. 3d 43, 48, 391 N.E.2d 568, 572-73 (1979).
213. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
214. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
215. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
216. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986 (quoting Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352).
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nies are obligated to pay only damages, not all liabilities arising out of pro-
ceedings at law.217
2. Legislative History of CERCLA
The statutory scheme of CERCLA section 9607(a)(4) provides further
support for a limited construction of damages. Under subsection
9607(a)(4)(A), the government can sue for reimbursement of cleanup
costs. 218 Subsection 9607(a)(4)(C), in contrast, permits the government to
sue for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources." 2 19 CERCLA, therefore, expressly differentiates between cleanup
costs and damages. But, while the government can seek money damages
pursuant to subsection 9607(a)(4)(C), it has generally instituted actions for
reimbursement of cleanup costs pursuant to CERCLA subsection
9607(a)(4)(A).220 By seeking recovery of cleanup costs from the insured, the
government has indicated its preference for equitable remedies. 221 The gov-
ernment suits, as recognized by numerous courts, do not represent a claim
for damages as required under the insurance policy.
2 2 2
In United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Court of Ap-
peals for Michigan found that the distinction between the recovery of
cleanup costs and the recovery of damages for injury to natural resources
was not meaningful.2 23 The court reasoned that the government's decision
either to clean up the contamination and later sue for reimbursement, or to
sue for damages for harm to natural resources, was an insufficient reason to
preclude coverage for cleanup costs. 2 24 It explained that the costs of restora-
tion were the measure of damage to natural resources.22 5 Under this line of
reasoning, the costs the government incurred as a result of cleaning up pollu-
tion would be the same as the amount of money damages the government
217. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352-53.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
219. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
220. See generally Crisham & Davis, CGL Coverage for Hazardous Substances Clean- Up,
FoR THE DEFENSE, Mar. 1988, at 21, 23 (discussing the distinction between governmental
cleanup actions seeking equitable relief and claims for money damages).
221. Armco, 643 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
222. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
223. United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 590, 336 N.W.2d
838, 843 (1983).
224. Id. at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
225. Id.
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recovered for injury to natural resources.226 The court, therefore, held that
cleanup costs are the equivalent of damages.2 27
The reasoning upon which the Aviex decision rests is faulty. First, CER-
CLA creates two separate causes of action under which the government can
seek either the recovery of cleanup costs or the recovery of damages.22 8
Whether the government chooses the equitable remedy of reimbursement of
cleanup costs or seeks an award of damages for injury to natural resources
often depends on the cost of liability imputed to the insured for cleanup costs
or for damages. 229 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have consequently rec-
ognized that the cost of restoring a hazardous waste site to its original state
may exceed an award of damages for the lOSS. 2 30 Moreover, there may be
circumstances in which the destruction of certain natural resources may ex-
ceed the cost of cleaning up a contaminated site.231 The distinction between
cleanup cost recovery claims and damages claims, therefore, is not merely
fortuitious from the standpoint of the insured.2 32
The legislative history of CERCLA further demonstrates that the reme-
dies available under the statute are not identical and are thus not necessarily
the same for insurance purposes.2 33 In a Senate debate on the measure of
damages to natural resources, Senator Simpson suggested that the tradi-
tional tort rules were applicable for calculating damages.2 34 Under these
rules, damages to natural resources can be calculated by awarding the differ-
ence in value of the resource before and after the injury and by calculating
the cost of restoration of the natural resource to its original condition.23 5 In
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., the court stated: "The calculation which provides
the least recovery in terms of dollars is the appropriate measure of dam-
ages. ' '2 36 Cleanup costs, in contrast, are not calculated according to the
traditional tort law analysis.
The distinction between the CERCLA remedies is also reflected in the
federal regulations promulgating the means for assessing damages for injury
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
229. Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 986-87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 66 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
230. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986-87; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353.
231. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987.
232. Id. at 986-87; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353.
233. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
234. 126 CONG. REC. 30,986 (1980) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
235. Id.
236. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Idaho 1986).
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to natural resources.23 7 Comments pertaining to the regulations specifically
emphasize that damages awarded for injury to natural resources are not
equivalent to the response or cleanup costs the government seeks to recover
pursuant to CERCLA subsection 9607(a)(4)(A). 238 An assessment of dam-
ages is designed to supplement response actions by the government, not to
replace them.239 According to the comments, the principal underlying the
theory of natural resource damages is that damages are compensatory. 2 °
The money awarded under this principle, thus, represents a measure of the
injury or loss sustained.241
Even assuming, under the A viex rationale, that the sums the insured is
liable to pay as cleanup costs under CERCLA subsection 9607(a)(4)(A) are
the same as the amount of money the insured is required to pay as damages
under CERCLA subsection 9607(a)(4)(C), it is the type of relief sought by
the government that obligates the insurer to pay.242 The question of cover-
age for the CERCLA claims against the insured rests on the terms of the
policy and the context in which those terms are used.24 3 The standard CGL
policy does not provide coverage for actions seeking equitable restitution. 2 "
Under the terms of the policy, the insurer has agreed only to pay all sums
the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages.245
B. Cleanup Costs Are Not the Measure of Property Damage
The standard CGL policy limits coverage to sums the insured is legally
obligated "to pay as damages because of ... property damage.... ,246 In
addition to establishing that the costs the government seeks to recover from
the insured constitute damages, the insured must show that it owes these
costs because of property damage.247 The CGL policy does not require a
finding of either damages or property damage; it expressly requires the estab-
237. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
238. 51 Fed. Reg. 27674 (1986) (comments accompanying Natural Resource Damage As-
sessments Final Rule).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 27680.
241. Id.
242. Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 66 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
243. See Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352-53; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499,
503 (5th Cir. 1955).
244. See NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
245. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1351-52; Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
246. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
247. Id.
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lishment of damages because of property damage.24 8 If the sums the govern-
ment seeks to recover from the insured do not constitute damages, then the
policy precludes coverage for those liabilities.24 9 Assuming, however, that
the insured's liabilities pursuant to CERCLA are damages, rather than costs
of an equitable nature, the insured must show than the government suits
seek relief based on a claim of property damage.2 5 °
Some courts have incorrectly held that the CGL policy covers cleanup
costs because the insured is legally obligated to pay these sums as damages
on account of property damage. 25  These courts reason that the policy re-
quires the insured to pay not only compensation for property damage, but
also all sums the insured must pay as a result of property damage, including
CERCLA response costs.2 5 2 After determining that the government has al-
leged a claim of property damage, the courts have concluded that all costs
necessitated by this property damage are covered under the policy. 253
Courts adopting this viewpoint have misconstrued the meaning of the pol-
icy language. The government claims for recovery of cleanup costs are not
claims for property damage.254 In the standard CGL policy, property dam-
age is defined as "physical injury to or destruction of tangible property."25
As noted in Armco, claims for recovery of cleanup costs pursuant to CER-
CLA subsection 9607(a)(4)(A) seek restitution; 256 these claims are designed
to reimburse the government for costs incurred as a result of restoring prop-
248. Id.; see also Armco, 643 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
249. See, e.g., NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986-87; Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Hanna, 224 F.2d
at 503.
250. See Soderstrom, supra note 36; supra text accompanying note 36.
251. NEPACCO, 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), reh'g en banc granted, 815 F.2d 51 (8th
Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66
(1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1168
(W.D Mich.), vacated on other grounds, 683 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Mich. 1988); see also supra
note 160 and accompanying text. See generally Abraham, Environmental Liability and the
Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 969-70 (1988) (discussing the weaknesses of the
rationales used to impose liability on insurers).
252. Thomas Solvent, 683 F. Supp. at 1168.
253. Id.; see also Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 8462/85, slip op. at 4 (N.Y.
Super. Ct. Nassau County Apr. 2, 1987), mod. on other grounds, 144 A.D.2d 445, 533
N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1988), appeal granted, 74 N.Y.2d 602, 541 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989); Wagner v.
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 609, 613 n.3, 427 N.W.2d 854, 856 n.3 (Ct. App. 1988).
254. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Idaho
1989).
255. See J. APPLEMAN, supra. note 37 and accompanying text.
256. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd,
822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
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erty to the status quo.2 57 The government claims for cleanup costs do not
arise from property damage, as required by the policy, but are based on the'
amount of money the government has expended to clean up the contamina-
tion.258 It is settled insurance law that strict economic losses do not consti-
tute property damage. 259  Under Mraz, cleanup costs sought by the
government are an economic loss, which falls outside the definition of prop-
erty damage.26
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue of coverage for government mandated cleanup costs is currently
unresolved. Further, it is unlikely that the issue will be resolved in the near
future. The effect of the unsettled law is twofold. First, for the insured who
contaminates the environment in a jurisdiction that has found no coverage,
the enormous financial obligations incurred in cleaning up a site without
insurance coverage may result in bankruptcy. Even in jurisdictions where
the court has found coverage for cleanup costs, the insured may face liability
problems; the insurer may choose not to insure chemical and manufacturing
companies in those jurisdictions, requiring those companies to pay even
higher premiums to obtain insurance coverage for their operations. Second,
where insurance companies choose not to insure some risks based on judicial
interpretations of the insurance policy provisions, the insurer will lose valua-
ble profits in premiums.
The public is also affected by the uncertain law in this area. The purpose
of the CERCLA and RCRA statutes is to provide a means for Federal and
State governments to prevent or control hazardous waste contamination.
The statutes are designed to force parties responsible for the contamination
to participate in the cleanup efforts. Although Congress has provided the
EPA with funds to initiate cleanup efforts, these funds are insufficient in
view of the number of hazardous waste sites the government currently recog-
nizes. If the insured is unable to pay for cleanup efforts and if the courts
hold that the insurer is not obligated to pay cleanup costs, the taxpayers will
be forced to contribute to the funding. Moreover, even if the insurer is held
liable for cleanup costs, the insurer will pass the liability costs on to its cus-
257. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352-53; Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129,
131, 106 A.2d 196, 198 (1954).
258. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1329.
259. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
260. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1329; see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources &
Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Idaho 1989); Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v.
Insurance Co. of Pa., No. C-514-463, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Nov.
24, 1987).
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tomers in the form of premiums, thereby affecting other nonliable insurance
consumers. In spite of these effects, courts should not permit the principle
parties responsible for causing or contributing to environmental contamina-
tion to pass the responsibility for cleanup onto the nonliable insurers. Nor
should courts rewrite insurance contracts in order to guarantee that the con-
tamination is cleaned up.
Lonnie Anne Jones

